This paper analyses the presence of duration dependence in Portuguese local governments' tenure employing continuous and discrete-time duration analyses over a set of spells of time in office for the period 1979-2005. Our results show that the more time a party remains in office, the higher is the likelihood of leaving it. However, more flexible polynomial-in-time, cubic splines and time-dummies specifications show that the behaviour of that likelihood is not monotonic: it increases but only until the third term, then it decreases until the sixth term before starting to increase again. This study also shows that the likelihood of an incumbent party leaving office, given his tenure, is affected by the local economic environment, political support, the effective number of parties, the dimension of the municipality and the age of its leader. Additionally, it shows that that likelihood is consistently lower when the party leader/mayor decides to run for another term.
Introduction
A significant body of research focuses on the performance of democracy. The importance of this topic made it a relevant subject in several fields of the political science and public choice, and different perspectives and approaches, directly or indirectly, tackle the question of democracy's efficiency. This paper analyses the presence of duration dependence in Portuguese local governments' tenure and the impact of some variables that are known to contribute to varying levels of electoral security. Whether one considers the duration in office to be a measure of democratic stability, policy continuity or executive dominance over the legislature, it is a subject that contributes to a better understanding of how democracy works.
Tenure in office and its determinants have received extensive scholarly attention.
Research on this area has been focused in phenomena such as cabinet duration, government survivability in parliamentary democracies, leadership tenure and career management. In this article we deviate from the more standard approaches and investigate party tenure as another aspect of political stability. We believe that this approach offers new insights and complements the existing literature. First, national governments termination has been the main subject of attention, and studies related to second order elections generally approach duration in the perspective of leadership tenure and politicians career management, and they are mainly focused on the United States. Portugal offers an alternative perspective as it is a multiparty proportional democracy and the political system is designed to favor parties not individual candidates making voters' behavior extremely attached to parties. Although the candidates' personality is electorally relevant parties are the key actors in Portuguese politics.
Second, research on party duration remains, to our knowledge, quite limited. Third, the emphasis on parties is useful in capturing major political changes and allows the examination of party incumbency hazards beyond the boundaries of a single administration. Political parties are ideologically heterogeneous and they all have different policy agendas, meaning that the political and economic impact of a change in governing parties is usually more significant than governing modifications that do not imply changes in the ruling party. The economy is particularly affected by party switching and partisan aspects of political cycles are well documented in the literature (see, for instance, Hibbs 1977; Alesina et al. 1997) . Cycles in elections are essential to the competitiveness of democracy since they prevent one-party dominance. We find these cycles throughout all democracies which suggests rising hazards of party incumbency. However these changes bring about policy shifts that affect primarily the stability of the economy but also entail social aspects. In this perspective the study of party incumbency allows us to check how the democratic process balances competitiveness with stability as more terms in office imply more stability, but most likely reduces competitiveness and impairs the alternation of power, one key aspects of democracy. This is an interesting issue because of the recent introduction in Portugal of a law that limits to three the number of consecutive terms a mayor can remain in office.
To analyse the patterns of tenure in local elections we use an extensive data set that covers all Portuguese mainland municipalities for the period 1979-2005. The Portuguese case offers an interesting scenario for this analysis for some reasons. First, election dates are fixed and defined exogenously from the perspective of local authorities. Second, all municipalities have elections on the same day at four year intervals. Third, there are no reelection institutional constrains because there is no legal limit on the number of terms a mayor can remain in office during the time span considered in this study.
1 Finally, local incumbents have a key influence in local policy and outcomes.
In this article, we provide a methodological framework to study local party duration in office. Duration models are employed to examine for the presence of duration dependence in the time in office of political parties. The impact of some economic and political variables is also taken into account. Estimating continuous and discrete-time duration models, this study provides evidence of positive duration dependence and confirms the impact of some economic and political factors on the length of time a party is in office. Additionally, more flexible polynomial-in-time, cubic splines and time-dummies specifications indicate that the behaviour of the hazard function is not monotonically increasing but it behaves in a nonlinear way: it increases until the third term, then it decreases until about the sixth term before 1 In 2005 the Portuguese parliament issued a law limiting the number of terms to three. However, it will only have a real impact in the 2013 local elections as the count started for all mayors in the 2005 elections. In the remainder of this paper the use of the word "term" refers to election term, not semester.
starting to increase again. This represents an important finding of this paper and contributes to the understanding and characterization of party tenure at the local level.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the literature. The econometric model is explained in section 3. Section 4 describes the data and discusses the main empirical results, and Section 5 concludes.
Literature
One first approach to the analysis of democratic stability is to study cabinet durability in parliamentary democracies, investigating the duration of national governments and why they are often dissolved prior to elections. 2 Early works, such as Taylor and Herman (1971), Laver (1974) , Dodd (1976) , Warwick (1979) , and Strom (1985) identify statistically the attributes that prolong or reduce governments' time in office, such as majority status, ideological compactness and party system fragmentation. Later, some research moved from this deterministic analysis to an essentially stochastic approach that highlighted the importance of external critical events such as international conflicts, economic crises and scandals to the survivability of incumbent administrations (see Browne et al. 1984 and Frendreis et al. 1986 ). The joining of these two perspectives came with the event-history method for analysing government durations proposed by King et al. (1990) that although stochastic in nature allowed for the hazard rate of governments to depend on a set of independent variables, including particular governments' attributes. They showed that majority governments last longer but more fractionalized party systems present a greater risk of termination. Using a similar approach, Warwick (1994) found that rising inflation and unemployment and high levels of ideological diversity contribute to an increase in the risk of termination. Other developments made this approach the standard method of analysing cabinet duration (see Warwick and Easton 1992; Warwick 1992 Warwick , 1994 Alt and King 1994; Stevenson 1999, 2000; Diermeier and Merlo 2000; Finocchiaro and Lin 2000) .
One of the advantages of the event-history method is that it allows the analysis of the risk of termination over the course of a government's life. King et al. (1990) seminal work 2 For an encompassing survey, see Laver (1974) .
considered the risk of collapse to be time invariant while Warwick and Easton (1992) and Warwick (1994) found evidence that hazard rates increase during the government's life. Alt and King (1994) Some studies instead of focusing on governments' duration try to analyse the length of political leaders' tenure. 4 In this article we deviate from these two approaches and investigate party tenure as another aspect of political stability. Maeda and Nishikawa (2006) examine the difference of presidential and parliamentary systems regarding government durability using the length of time governing parties stay in the executive office, while Lin and Guillen (1998) examine changes and durations of party control in the United States presidential elections.
Changes in governing parties generally result in more policy modifications than government composition changes, therefore the survivability of parties in office is an important perspective of democratic stability, especially in the socioeconomic dimension.
Even though survival in office depends partially on voter behaviour, governing parties that lose votes do not always lose elections, making duration analysis a different angle to electoral competition. Party tenure in office is dependent on the passage of time, and we find in the literature two contending hypothesis concerning its effect: incumbency may be a liability or an asset (Rose and Mackie 1983) . The argument of political erosion related to failures, political crises and other negative national or international events implies that incumbency is a liability. 5 According to the second hypothesis, incumbency gives parties a big advantage regarding resources because they have control over the bureaucracy, solid patronage networks, access to privileged information and control over the economic policy. Therefore, the longer a party stays in government the more resources it has at its disposal to maintain its position.
Whether and under what conditions incumbency is an advantage or a disadvantage for a party's survival in power is an empirical question that remains without a clear answer.
Econometric model
Duration analysis has been widely used in labour economics to study the duration of periods of unemployment. 6 King et al. (1990) , Warwick and Easton (1992) , Warwick (1994) and Alt and King (1994) introduced and developed this methodology to national governments, cabinets and political leaders' survivability analyses. In a more recent study, Finocchiaro and Lin (2000) looks at the impact of US congressional tenure on the hazards of electoral termination. We extend these applications to the study of party tenure at local governance, defining the duration variable as the number of consecutive terms a party remains in office at the local level in Portugal (TLGov).
Two basic functions for duration analysis are the hazard function (h(t)) and the
). The hazard function measures the rate at which 5 Evidence of popularity erosion over time in office is well documented in the voting literature. See, for example, the seminal paper by Mueller (1970) . Veiga and Veiga (2004) also report the existence of costs of ruling for Portuguese governments.
parties leave office at the end of term t, given that they remain in office during that term, i.e.
, where T is a random variable that indicates the time at which the event occurs. The survivor function measures the probability of party's incumbency to be greater than or equal to t, i.e. ) (
The hazard function is useful to characterize the dependence path of duration. If dh(t)/dt>0 in moment t=t * , then there is positive duration dependence in t * , which means that the probability of a party leaving office at moment t, given that it has stayed until t, increases with t. An opposite conclusion is reached if the derivative is negative. There will be no duration dependence if the derivative is equal to zero.
The hazard function can be estimated by parametric methods. A functional form that is usually employed to parameterize the hazard function is the proportional hazards model:
where h 0 (t) is the baseline hazard function that captures the dependency of the data to duration, β is a k×1 vector of parameters to be estimated and x is a vector of covariates. The baseline hazard is often characterized by a Weibull distribution:
where γ>0 is a constant term and p>0 is the duration dependence parameter. If p>1, there is positive duration dependence; if p<1 there is negative duration dependence; no duration dependence is found if p=1. Hence, by estimating p, we can test for duration dependence in parties' incumbency. This model is estimated by Maximum Likelihood and the corresponding log-likelihood function for a sample of i=1,…,n spells can be written as follows:
where c i indicates when observations are censored. 7 This means that the ratio of the hazard rates for any two observations is constant over time. 
which is equivalent to the complementary log-log (or cloglog) function, where ) ln ( 
Other more flexible specifications can be considered instead of the Weibull, like: (i) a polynomial-in-time specification ( ... (ii) piecewise-dummies -one dummy for each particular sub-period of time -where the hazard rate is assumed to be the same within each time-group but different between those groups ( ... 
); (iii) or a fully non-parametric specification with one dummy for each value of t for which an event is reported (time-dummies). Given their flexibility, some of these alternatives will also be evaluated in this study.
9 Allison (1982, p.70) states that when those "discrete units are very small, relative to the rate of event occurrence, it is usually acceptable to ignore the discreteness and treat time as if it was measured continuously.
[However,] when the time units are very large -months, quarters, years, or decades -this treatment becomes problematic." 10 These models are analysed in detail by Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) , Allison (1982) and Kiefer (1988) . 11 Note that θ t =lnh t =ln(γpt p-1 )=α+(p-1)lnt, with α=ln(γp) and t=TLGov. Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) and Allison (1982) show that discrete-time loglikelihood function for a sample of n i ,..., 1 = spells can be written as follows:
where the dummy variable y it is equal to 1 if party's i incumbency ends at time t, and 0 otherwise. The model will be estimated by Maximum Likelihood substituting P ij by (4) and using one of the above specifications of θ t for the logarithm of the baseline hazard function.
Empirical analysis
The empirical results from the estimation of the Weibull and cloglog models and other more flexible specifications for the hazard function are analysed in this section. However, we start by presenting the data employed in this duration analysis.
Data
The data used in duration analysis consist of spells. In this study, a spell represents the number of terms a party is in office (TLGov). The data were collected for the 278 mainland Table 1 .
[Insert Table 1 around here]
To control for the local economic environment we use the growth rate of local income index (Income), the growth rate of local purchasing power index (PurchPower) and the unemployment rate (UnempRate). 12 The first two are proxies for municipalities' wealth which 12 The regional (NUTS III) unemployment rate was available from the Portuguese National Institute of Statistics (INE) only for 1991 and from 1999 onwards, thus reducing time variability and the number of observations. To overcome this difficulty, we estimated a proxy for the unemployment rate for the remaining years of the 1990s using the multiple imputation algorithm developed by Honaker and King (2010).
we expect to have a negative effect on the likelihood of a party leaving office at a given moment in time. Additionally and according to Warwick (1994) , we also consider that rising unemployment may contribute to an increase in the risk of termination of the time in office.
Municipal expenditures are another economic factor that might affect the likelihood of a party leaving office. To test this hypothesis we include in the model the local real total expenditure per capita (TotExpd) and capital expenditure per capita (CapExpd). As Veiga and Veiga (2007) found strong evidence of political budgetary cycles in Portuguese municipalities, 13 we expect that an increase in expenditures is likely to decrease the chances of a party leaving the office (or increasing its duration).
The model also includes a set of political variables that were obtained from the
Technical Staff for Matters Concerning the Electoral Process (STAPE).
14 To control for past electoral support and as indicators of good governance conditions, we consider three variables: a dummy for local majority governments (MajGov); the percentage of votes obtained by the party in local government in the previous election (PVotes); and the difference in the percentage of votes between the party in local government and the second most voted party in the municipality in the previous election (DifPVotes). These variables are expected to be positively related to the tenure in office (i.e. negatively related to the likelihood of a party leaving office). An additional variable used to control for the competition among parties is the Laakso and Taegepera (1979) index for the effective number of political parties/forces that represent electoral lists in each municipality (EffNrParties). It controls for political fragmentation and electoral competitiveness, which according to King et al. (1990) are expected to be negatively related to the likelihood of a party leaving office.
Another political indicator used is SParty: a dummy variable equalling 1 when a local government is controlled by the party that holds power at the national level. We believe that the typical popularity erosion process of national governments may endanger the party's chances of remaining in office at the local level. However, if the spillover effects are positive 13 See also Baleiras, and Costa (2004) . Other studies find similar results for other countries. See, for instance, Galli and Rossi (2002) for Germany, Sakurai (2011) for Brazil, and Padovano (2012) for Italy 14 The data for TLGov were also obtained from this source.
we may find the opposite result. Additionally, we also consider a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the incumbent is a left-wing party (Left) to take into account the possibility of political orientation effects.
The dimension of the municipality can also be an issue to consider in the group of factors that may affect party's tenure. Hence, four dummies to control for the dimension (D_Dim) are considered: D_Dim1 takes value 1 for the two biggest councils (Porto and Lisbon); D_Dim2 takes value 1 for municipalities with population over 40000; D_Dim3 takes value 1 for municipalities with population between 10000 and 40000; D_Dim4 takes value 1 for municipalities with less than 10000 inhabitants. Three of them will be included in the model, but their expected signs are not clear. The visibility that parties acquire when ruling big and important municipalities can be an incentive for them to make all the necessary efforts to be in office for longer, but the competitiveness from the other parties may also be higher, which may affect negatively their tenure.
Finally, to capture individual characteristics of the mayor/political leader of the party in office, we control for the age of the leader and residency within the borders of the municipality from which he is elected. No particular conjectures are made for these variables, but it is possible that older leaders that live in a different municipality might affect negatively the time a given party is in the local office due to a possible lower commitment to the job.
Descriptive statistics for all variables used in this study are reported in Table 2 .
[Insert Table 2 around here]
Weibull and cloglog estimations
We start the empirical analysis presenting the hazard rates for the number of terms in office. Table 3 shows the pattern of the 385 observed tenure spells that ended or were censored at each of the 8 terms identified for the sample period considered in this study. The second column shows the total number of spells at risk of ending in the respective term, while the third column indicates how many spells ended at each term. A spell is censored when it has not ended by 2005. The estimates of the hazard rate presented in column 5 were obtained dividing the number of spells that ended by the total number of spells at risk in that term. The last column presents the evolution of the hazard rates and shows that the conditional probability of an incumbency spell ending at term t, given that it has not ended yet, tends to increase over time, i.e. over the terms. 15 Hence, we have here some indication of positive duration dependence in local governments' tenure.
[Insert Table 3 around here]
A deeper statistical examination of this issue is provided in Table 4 with a parametric decreasing positive duration dependence (p is statistically lower than 2), which means that the probability of incumbency termination at the end of term t, given that they are in office at term t, increases over time but at a decreasing rate. 18 The evolution of the hazard rates presented in Table 3 had already pointed out to this possibility. This "decreasing rate" means that there are some incumbent parties that tend to remain in office even after several terms.
[Insert Table 4 around here] 15 Note, however, that the slump of the hazard rates in the fourth and fifth terms may indicate that the trend might not be linear or monotonically increasing. This is an important issue that we will explore in this study.
Nevertheless, as a starting point, we rely on the assumption of an underlying monotonic increasing trend. 16 The LRI is a measure of fit for discrete choice models, equivalent to the R 2 in the linear OLS model, also called "pseudo-R 2 ". Regarding the economic environment, we test for the effects of some (available) local economic variables, as it is natural that an incumbent party is more likely to be defeated when the economy is not performing well. Those variables are the growth rate of the local income index (Income), the purchasing power index (PurchPower), the unemployment rate (UnempRate), and the total and capital expenditures (TotExpd and CapExpd) . 19 The results
show that only the coefficient on PurchPower is statistically significant: an improvement in this proxy for local economic conditions contributes to an increase in the likelihood of a local government remaining in office. 20 Thus, we have some evidence that the incumbent party has to take care of the local economic environment if it indeed intends to remain in office.
Some political variables that are usually employed in the government termination literature are also added to the model. To collect the influence of the electoral or political support, we consider three variables: a dummy that takes value 1 when the ruling party has a 19 We also tried several estimations with national variables, such growth rate of national GDP and inflation rate, and with municipal current expenditures and taxes, but none of them has proved to be statistically significant.
Those results are not reported here, but they are available upon request. We expect that those variables are relevant to explain parties' tenure at the local level.
The results indicate that only the coefficient on Left is not statistically significant. As expected, a higher political and electoral support (Majority, PVotes and DifPVotes) is positively related to the likelihood of a party remaining in power. In fact, a higher percentage of votes or a higher difference to the second most voted party in the previous election contributes positively to the accumulation of the necessary political capital that helps parties to remain in office for a longer period of time. As expected, the effect is similar when the political fragmentation or competitiveness is lower. Finally, the results present some evidence that when local governments are of the same party as the national government, they tend to leave office sooner. This may reflect a negative spillover effect coming from the popularity erosion process of national government's that affects party chances at the local level.
Some additional variables are also included in the model to control for the individual characteristics of the municipality and the party leader. Three dummy variables that take into account the dimension or importance of the Municipality (D_Dim) are included to check whether the higher power and visibility offered by bigger Municipalities affects the pattern of local governments' tenure. The results show that it might be the case. In fact, the likelihood of government termination is higher in the two biggest municipalities than in the smallest but it is lower in the other "big" municipalities. In the first case, this may reflect the fact that parties regard their electoral results in the biggest municipalities as critical. Hence, with higher competitiveness at these municipalities incumbents tend to remain in office for fewer terms.
Additionally, they have a higher propensity to be affected by more frequent changes in the leader. The higher visibility they acquire gives them enough political capital to move to other better political positions at national level. In the other big municipalities the effect is the opposite maybe because parties are more able to consolidate their political support and the respective leaders are more committed in making their political career in those big and relatively important municipalities than they are in the smallest ones.
22
Finally, regarding the age and residency of the mayor/leader of the local party in office, only age has proved to be relevant. 23 Its coefficient indicates a positive impact on the likelihood of its party's leaving the office. Hence, the permanence of a party in office becomes at risk when its leader is or becomes older.
Other specifications for the hazard function
The Weibull model, as a parametric model, imposes a restrictive constraint on the shape of the hazard, since its continuous distribution -as well as its discrete equivalent -can only rise or decline monotonically. However, this pattern may not be empirically realistic. 24 In fact, in Table 3 we noticed the presence of a slump in the hazard rates at the fourth and fifth terms, which might raise doubts about the adequacy of a monotonically increasing Weibull distribution to these data. Therefore, other more flexible specifications should be considered and tested. We start by considering, in the cloglog framework, some polynomial-in-time specifications for the hazard function: linear, quadratic and cubic.
Taking into account the results presented in Table 5 , we conclude that the cubic specification seems to be the one best fitting the data. 25 That is the case, not only because all 22 A deeper analysis of the leader's re-candidacy effects on the party's incumbency is provided below. 23 We also controlled for the gender of the political leader and his/her educational qualifications, but no relevant/significant effects were found.
24 Finocchiaro and Lin (2000) also note this fact and argue for the use of other more flexible specifications. 25 The covariates used in the regressions reported in Table 5 are the ones that proved to be, at least, marginally significant in the previous estimations in order to keep the analysis as parsimonious as possible. In particular, we the three coefficients in the cubic polynomial specification (column 3) are highly significant, but also because the LR tests have rejected the linear and quadratic specifications. 26 The cubic specification of TLGov is also a better alternative than the selected discrete-time specification reported in column 7 of Table 4 . Notice, for example, that the value of the log-likelihood and the LRI are higher in the former than in the later, the AIC and the SBIC are lower and the LR test also favours the cubic specification. 27 Hence, we can rely on the polynomial-in-time cubic specification for TLGov to analyse the tenure of Portuguese local governments.
[Insert Table 5 around here]
The results provided by this estimation are quite interesting and indicate that the likelihood of parties leaving office increases over time (the coefficient on TLGov is positive), but only until a certain number of terms; then it decreases (the coefficient on TLGov2 is negative), but after a while it starts to increase again (the coefficient on TLGov3 is positive).
In fact, this evidence is in line with the hazard rates presented in Table 3 (notice the slump in terms 4 and 5). Moreover, the estimated hazard function plotted in Figure 1 for the cloglogcubic specification -obtained from the regression 3 in Table 5 -also confirms this behaviour: 28 the likelihood of incumbent parties leaving office increases until the third term, but then it decreases until about the sixth term, before starting to increase again. This result is in accordance with the "sophomore" effect found by Erikson (1972) , Alford and Hibbing use as benchmark the variables employed in the cloglog estimation reported in column 7 of 26 The likelihood ratio tests for the comparisons between the cubic specification for the hazard rate and the linear and quadratic ones are, respectively, 16.2 and 9.8, which favours the cubic specification at a 5% level. In fact the statistical significance in the polynomial cubic specification is much higher than in the linear and quadratic ones.
27 LR = 2(361.4-355.6) = 11.60 > χ 2 (2);5% = 5.99. 28 All the estimated hazard functions plotted in Figure 1 where obtained from the respective regression for an "average" government whose values for the covariates are set at their sample means, except for the dummies SParty, D_Dim1 and D_Dim2, which were evaluated at their mode (0). (1981) and Finocchiaro and Lin (2000) . The rate of survival in office, in the first terms, can be affected by the process of building up reputation. However, Erikson's (1972) finds that the inversion occurs in the second electoral contest, meaning that, for Portuguese local governments, this process seems to be harder as it takes one extra term to invert. It seems that the first three consecutive terms do not impair electoral competitiveness, but it is quite the opposite: the likelihood of incumbent parties leaving office increases. After the third term we witness a general effect of democratic stability in party governance as the odds of maintaining office increase. The cost of this stability is electoral competitiveness and the main practical consequence may be turnout decline. 29 Theoretically, this scenario also seems to collide with one of democracy's main aspect: alternation of power. In 2005 Portugal issued a law limiting to three the number of consecutive terms a mayor can remain in office. Our results show that indeed the third term of a party in office is a significant switching point. In the next section we also show that this switching point exists with and without the mayor running for another term, although the effects on party odds are clearly stronger in scenarios of re-candidacy. If the objective of the law limiting the number of terms is to foster electoral competitiveness, our data suggests that the choice of three mandates was indeed the most effective one.
Our results capture yet another interesting effect: after the sixth mandate the parties' likelihood to leave office starts to increase again. Probably, in average, at this point the costs of ruling become dominant making it harder for the incumbent party to be reelected.
[Insert Figure 1 around here]
This evidence contrasts with the monotonically increasing hazard rate obtained for the Weibull specification (see cloglog-weibull in Figure 1 , which was estimated from regression 7 in Table 4 ). Even though some doubts may remain regarding the configuration of the hazard function, those can be clarified with the estimation of a more flexible specification that imposes no constraints on the shape of the hazard: a fully non-parametric or time-dummies specification with one dummy for each value of t for which an event is reported. Now the coefficients on the dummies allow for a free determination of the shape of the hazard. 29 There is ample evidence of this relationship in the turnout literature. See Geys (2006) for a review.
The results for the estimation of a time-dummies specification are presented in column 4 of Table 5 and show that the increase in the likelihood of a party leaving office is nonlinear.
The coefficients do not increase steadily over the terms. Instead, they evolve in jumps or ups and downs, which are very clear in Figure 1 (cloglog-dummy) . Nevertheless, it resembles more the cloglog-cubic than the cloglog-weibull hazard function.
According to Beck et al. (1998) and Finocchiaro and Lin (2000) , one drawback of using dummy variables in these models is the fact that the respective estimated hazard function is likely to "zig-zag" in time. 30 That is indeed the case here. Hence, the results may not be easily interpretable. Beck at al. (1998) suggest using "natural cubic splines" to smooth out the coefficients and the hazard function based on them. Now the vector of dummy variables will be replaced by a vector of spline basis variables which are cubic polynomials of t (or TLGov). Since the number of spline variables needed is lower than the number of timedummies, statistical significance will be easier to achieve and the time-dependence of the hazard function is straightforward to test.
The results with three cubic splines are presented in column 5 of Table 5 and show that the coefficients on the covariates remain statistically significant and present the expected signs. Moreover, the coefficients on the splines are also highly significant. 31 The best way of interpreting them is to look at the respective estimated hazard function in Figure 1 (cloglogspline). This hazard function adjusts quite well to the cloglog-dummy hazard function, but the most interesting finding is that the cloglog-spline specification is corroborating the results obtained with the parametric-in-time cubic specification.
In an additional analysis, we decided to test the robustness of the cloglog model in comparison with a logit model like the one used by Finocchiaro and Lin (2000) in a study the Congressional tenure in the United States. Even though its estimated coefficients are not the 30 Additionally, since there is usually high collinearity among the dummy variables, individual coefficient estimates tend to have large standard errors. 31 The three spline basis variables correspond to "knots" at terms 1, 2, 4, and 8, respectively. This set of knots was chosen because it produces statistically significant variables and the lowest p-value in rejecting the null model in likelihood ratio tests. Two, three and five-knot solutions were also tried, but none of them produced better results. Those results are not reported here, but they are available upon request.
discrete-time equivalent of the underlying continuous-time model, the logit model is employed here to estimate the probability of a party leaving office (leaving=1; 0, otherwise), using the same term-dummies (column 6), splines (column 7) and the other covariates. The estimated coefficients present a lower statistical significance and the results show that it is not able to capture the cubic behaviour that characterizes the Portuguese parties' tenure, as can be confirmed in Figure 1 (logit-dummy and logit-spline). Hence, the cloglog-cubic and cubic cloglog-spline specifications remain as the preferable specifications to this study.
Re-candidacy effects
A final aspect that deserves particular attention is the effect of the Mayor's decision of running (or not) for another term in office on the respective party incumbency. The political capital and expertise acquired by the mayor may contribute positively to increase the incumbent party's likelihood of remaining in office for another term. Hence, we conjecture that when a mayor decides do seek reelection the risk of his party leaving office decreases.
Thus, we expect a negative sign for the coefficient on the variable used to collect this effect: a dummy variable that takes value 1 when the mayor runs for another term in office (Recand).
To analyse the re-candidacy effects we estimate some regressions with the dummy Recand in the cubic cloglog-spline specification selected in the previous sub-section. 32 The results are presented in Table 6 . In the first regression, only the variable Recand is added to the model. In the following regression, this variable is multiplied by each spline. In the third regression, these multiplicative variables and the dummy Recand are included at the same time in the model. The two additional regressions are separate regressions for the cases in which mayors do not run for another term (column 4) and for those who run (column 5).
[Insert Table 6 around here]
The results show that the mayor's decision to run for office again increases his party's chances to remain in office, which means that there is a strong bond between the party in 32 The results have proved to be very similar when the cloglog-cubic specification was used instead. To keep the analysis parsimonious, those results are not reported here but they are available upon request.
office and the political capital and expertise acquired by its leader. 33 Hence, political parties benefit from the "status" and stability of its leader. This conclusion is reinforced when we look at the coefficients on the multiplicative dummies in regression 2. When we add Recand to this specification, they are no longer statistically significant but the coefficient on Recand confirms the findings reported in column 1. Even though the statistical significance of the coefficients on some of the additional regressors decreases, the main conclusions remain valid: the likelihood of an incumbent party leaving office, given his tenure, is affected by the political support, the effective number of parties, the dimension of the municipality and the age of the leader; only the coefficients on the variable that reflects the local economic environment (PurchPower) and SParty loose their statistical significance. The results are quite similar when we consider only data for mayors that seek reelection (regression 5).
However, it is more difficult to find statistically significant coefficients in the separate regression for the case in which the mayor is not a candidate (regression 4).
All these specifications allow us to identify differences in the splines and in the hazard rates between the cases in which mayors decide to run for another term and those in which they decide not to do so. Figure 2 presents a clear picture of those differences between the respective hazard rates. Each graph presents the evolution of the hazard rates for the regressions estimated in Table 6 , considering the cases in which mayors do not seek reelection (recand=0) and those who seek (recand=1).
[Insert Figure 2 around here]
All the pictures confirm that the likelihood of a party leaving office is consistently higher when its leader (current mayor) decides not to run for another term. The "sophomore" effect is also confirmed, which is stronger when mayors decide not to run for another term.
This effect is smoother for those cases in which mayors run for another term. Two important conclusions can be withdrawn from this evidence. First, the gains in terms of political capital and expertise acquired by the mayors represent an important asset for a party to remain in 33 Nevertheless, the citizens may also appreciate the candidate per se, which can generate reputational gains for those that are well known to citizens, especially in small municipalities.
office. Second, as the likelihood of a party leaving office, for the cases in which mayors decide to seek reelection, decreases precisely after the third term, we have here interesting evidence to support the rule, established in 2005, of a limit of three terms in office for Portuguese mayors. This law seems to have the effect of boosting electoral competitiveness at municipal elections, however this is achieved at the cost of local political stability.
Conclusions
This study analyses the presence of duration dependence in Portuguese local governments' tenure and the impact of some economic and political variables on the likelihood of a party leaving the office after some terms.
Estimating continuous and discrete-time duration models over a data set that covers all
Portuguese mainland municipalities and electoral terms for the period 1979-2005, this study finds evidence of positive duration dependence in local governance. In particular, our results
show that the more terms a party remains in office, the higher the likelihood of leaving the office at the end of the current term is and the shorter its tenure will be. Moreover, our findings also indicate that this likelihood increases but at a decreasing rate, which means that there is a group of local governments that tend to persist in office.
However, more flexible polynomial-in-time, cubic splines and time-dummies specifications show that the behaviour of that likelihood is not monotonically increasing but behaves in a nonlinear way: the likelihood of a local government leaving office increases but only until the third term, then it decreases until about the sixth term before starting to increase again. This may indicate that the rate of survival in office, in the first terms, can be affected by the process of building up reputation. Moreover, the three terms limit established in 2005
for Portuguese mayors is expected to boost competitiveness at local elections as our findings report that the likelihood of a party leaving office decreases precisely after the third term.
These results for the duration of Portuguese local party governments are in line with the "sophomore" effect found by Erikson (1972) , Alford and Hibbing (1981) and Finocchiaro and Lin (2000) . Moreover, they show that the hazards rate is not constant or monotonically increasing, contrasting with the studies of King et al. (1990) , Warwick and Easton (1992) , Warwick (1994) and Alt and King (1994) that focus on the duration of national governments, cabinets and political leaders. Instead, our results for local party governments point out to a non-monotonic hazard rate. Some aspects may explain this difference in the hazard behaviour.
Institutionally, in Portugal, the risk of leaving office is higher for national governments as termination may occur at any moment of the mandate giving way to an unscheduled electoral contest. At the local level, although this mid-term termination can happen (however it rarely does), elections can only occur at fixed four year intervals. Nevertheless, contrary to local governments, national governments face significant media exposure, stronger and clearer accountability with regard to economic conditions and social policies and other features that strongly increase the costs of ruling. This erodes national governments' popularity much faster and makes it harder for them to remain in power for long periods of time. Furthermore, local governments, especially in small municipalities, can more easily form personal ties with their constituencies making it easier to gather durable political support and reputation.
Regarding the additional economic and political conditionings, this study shows that the length of local governments' tenure tends to increase when local economic environment is favourable, the incumbent party has enough political support and the degree of political fragmentation and electoral competitiveness in the municipality is low. The incumbent party's tenure is also conditioned by the dimension of the municipality and by the age of its leader.
Additionally, our results also show that the likelihood of a party leaving office is consistently higher when its leader/mayor decides not to run for another term.
Finocchiaro, C., Lin, T., 2000. The hazards of incumbency: An event history analysis of Table 1 . Robust standard errors (clustered by municipality) for the estimated coefficients are in parentheses. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. The sign "+" indicates that p is significantly higher than 1 using a 5% one-sided test with robust standard errors; d indicates the presence of decreasing positive duration dependence at a 5% level. AIC=2[-LogL+k] and SBIC=2[-LogL+(k/2)LogN], where LogL is the log-likelihood for the estimated model, k is the number of regressors and N is the number of observations. LRI is the likelihood ration index or pseudo-R 2 (LRI=1-LogL/LogL 0 , where L 0 is the likelihood of the model with only a constant term). "Censored" indicates de number of censored observations. Column (1) presents the results of a continuous-time Weibull model; Columns (2)- (7) show the results of discrete-time cloglog model. Table 4 . Robust standard errors (clustered by municipality) for the estimated coefficients are in parentheses. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. The cloglog regressions (1) to (3) were performed using polynomial baseline hazard functions: linear, quadratic and cubic, respectively. A cloglog model is also employed in estimations reported in columns (4) and (5). Fully non-parametric specifications with one dummy for each term, or value of TLGov, are used in regressions (4) and (6). A logit model is employed in the estimations reported in columns (6) and (7). In regressions (5) and (7) are considered three natural cubic splines of TLGov, with knots at terms 1, 2, 4 and 8. Table 4 . Robust standard errors (clustered by municipality) for the estimated coefficients are in parentheses. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. The cloglog regressions were performed using the polynomial baseline hazard function with the three natural cubic splines considered in column (5) of Table 5 . In regression (4) are used only spells in which mayors do not run for office again; In regression (5) are considered only data for those cases in which mayors seek reelection. Notes: See Figure 1 and Table 6 2010-01 
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